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Abstract 
 
This paper shows that the gender of politicians affects the educational levels of individuals who 
grow up in the districts where these politicians are elected. Increasing female political 
representation by 10 percentage points increases the probability that an individual attains 
primary education in urban areas by 6 percentage points, which is 21% of the difference in 
primary education attainment between the richest and the poorest Indian states. Caste also 
matters, as female politicians who won seats reserved for lower castes and disadvantaged tribes 
are those who mainly have an effect. In addition, both the gender and caste of politicians 
determine who benefits more from their policies: in urban areas female politicians increase 
educational achievements of those of their gender and caste. A unique dataset collected on 
politicians in India is matched with individual data by cohort and district of residence. The 
political data allow the identification of close elections between women and men, which yield 
quasi-experimental election outcomes used to estimate the causal effect of the gender of 
politicians. 
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the impact of the gender of politicians in the Indian state governments
on the educational achievements of a sample of citizens who live in the districts where these
politicians are elected. It then analyzes whether caste also matters by comparing the effect of
female politicians who won seats reserved for lower castes and disadvantaged tribes with the
effect of female politicians who won unreserved seats. Finally, it investigates whether female
politicians favour more those individuals who belong to their gender and caste groups.
The motivation behind this study is twofold. First, India accounts for more than one-third
of the world’s poor and has very low educational attainments. The adult literacy rate in
2003 was 61%, approximately the same as that in Sub-Saharan Africa, an area which is 1.5
times poorer. Female literacy rate was 47%, lower than the 52% observed in Sub-Saharan
Africa (Human Development Report 2005). Moreover, educational differences are large across
genders, castes, and rural/urban areas.
Given that political institutions play a major role in providing education and are led by
people of different political persuasions, it is important to understand whether characteristics
of these politicians determine the type of policies applied.
Second, it is important to understand whether the gender of a politician makes a difference.
The issue of female political representation has been increasingly important in India, as some
positions in local governments are reserved for women. However, this has not yet been the case
of state governments, which actually play the main role in primary and secondary education.
To assess whether the gender of politicians matters for educational outcomes, I use a
detailed dataset that I collected with information about 29686 politicians, who contested seats
in the 16 biggest states in India during 1967-2001. These data are combined with National
Sample Survey data to estimate the effect on individuals’ primary education attainment of
the identity of the politicians who were in power in their districts in India when they were
young. The district is the best unit of analysis because it allows me to estimate the effect of
the gender of the politicians in the smallest possible area where their electoral constituency
is located. Moreover, given that the Indian districts are the lower level of administration and
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have educational offices, legislators in a particular district could also direct funds to these
offices, having an effect not only on their constituencies but also on the overall district.
The key challenge is to empirically identify the causal effect of female politicians on the
education of an individual. This is difficult because omitted variables are likely to affect both
electoral outcomes and policy. To identify the effect of female representatives the share of
constituencies in the district won by a female politician is instrumented with the share of
constituencies in the district won by a female politician in a close election, i.e. by a small
percentage of votes, against a male politician. The instrument is valid because the fact that
a male or a female candidate won in a close election can be considered to be largely random;
therefore, female candidates who won in a close election against a man will be elected in
similar constituencies and under similar circumstances as male candidates who won in a close
election against a woman.
I find that the politician’s gender matters for educational achievements. In particular,
primary educational attainment is higher in urban areas of a district if female political repre-
sentation in this district is higher. Increasing female political representation by 10 percentage
points increases the probability that an individual attains primary education in urban areas
by 6 percentage points, which is 8 % of the probability of attaining primary education in an
urban area. In contrast, female representation does not have an effect on individuals living in
rural areas of the district.
A possible explanation for these results is based on the fact that female politicians may care
about the needs of women. Education is more important for women in urban areas, because
returns to education, proxied by wage differentials between educated and uneducated women
are higher there. Men can benefit from education both in urban and rural areas, because
wage differentials between educated and uneducated men are similar in rural and urban areas.
Moreover, it will be easier for an educated man than for an educated woman in a rural area
to move to an urban area in search of nonfarm employment, where their skills are required.
So, female politicians will invest more in education in urban areas, whereas male politicians
will invest both in rural and urban areas.
In the state governments some seats are reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
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Tribes (SC/ST), which are at the bottom of the hierarchal caste system in India. Given
that SC/ST female legislators could have different policy preferences from the rest, I use this
institutional feature to identify gender effects by caste. In addition, to the extent that female
politicians may belong to higher classes than male politicians1, the estimated effect of gender
might capture the effect of class as well as gender. By estimating separately the effects of
SC/ST and general female legislators, in reserved and nonreserved2 seats, I can account for
this. After dividing female politicians on the basis of whether they contested for a SC/ST
reserved seat or not, SC/ST female legislators have a positive effect on the education received
by individuals living in urban areas but not in rural areas. Because SC/ST female politicians
come from a more disadvantaged background than general female legislators, this confirms
that the results obtained are due to gender, and not due to class differences.
The identity of the politicians, defined by gender and caste, is then matched with the
identity of individuals who grow up in the districts where they are elected. Results show
that female politicians increase the probability girls attain primary education in urban areas.
When defining identity as gender and caste, results show that politicians target their own
groups: SC/ST female politicians increase the probability that girls and SC/ST individuals
attain primary education while general female politicians increase the probability that girls
and general individuals attain primary education.
Finally, a last set of results show that the effect of female representation is stronger when
they are more influential, either within the district or in the Legislative Assembly. For example,
those female politicians belonging to the main party and belonging to the states where there
are more female legislators are those who have the strongest effect. The effect is also stronger
on individuals living in small districts, with fewer constituencies, capturing better the effect of
a politician on its constituency. Moreover, the effect of female politicians is less when there is
a political disruption, namely President’s Rule, for a longer period in the state and when they
may have to compete for funds in the district with other female politicians. This confirms that
the effects found are more likely to be due to their political actions than to the role model
1If the cost of contesting in elections is higher for women than for men.
2These are called “general seats”. I will use this terminology from now on in the paper.
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they may play.
This paper combines the literature on the determinants of education and the one on the
identity of the legislator. Recent studies on education focus on the evaluation of policies
related to an increase in the number of educational inputs (Banerjee et al 2007 and Chin
2005), or on the effect of different household, labour market, village and school characteristics
on educational attainments (Dreze and Kingdon 2001). Other papers study the impact of
traditional institutions on education, see Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) and Pandey (2005).
This study complements the literature on education in developing countries by analyzing
whether the identity of the politicians who decide the educational policies in India has an
effect on educational outcomes.
Recent studies on the identity of the legislator in India analyze the effect of different
reservation policies and conclude that the identity of the legislator matters for policy determi-
nation, as reservation has an effect on policy. Chattopadhay and Duflo (2004) show how the
reservation of one-third of the seats for women in Panchayats (local rural self-government) in
the states of West Bengal and Rajasthan has a positive effect on investment in infrastructure
relevant to women’s needs. Pande (2003) analyses how the reservation of seats for SC/STs
in the State Assemblies increases the transfers that these groups receive. Besley et al (2004)
study the effect of reservations for SC/STs in village councils on the public goods that lower
castes receive. Bardhan et al (2005) examine the effect of reservations of Panchayat Pradhans
on targeting to poor and SC/ST households.
The contributions of this paper to the literature are as following: it analyzes the effect of
variation in female political representation due to electoral outcomes rather than reservation
policies. It studies separately the effect of general and SC/ST female legislators, controlling
for the class effect. It also focuses on the effect of politicians who contested seats in the State
Assemblies during a long time period on individual educational outcomes in the districts where
these politicians were elected rather than on the states as a whole. Finally, it studies whether
female politicians benefit more those citizens of their gender and caste group than the others3.
3Literature from developed countries shows how female and male legislators make different policy decisions.
For example, see Thomas (1991), Thomas and Welch (1991), Case (1998 & 2000), Besley and Case (2000 &
2002) and Rehavi (2003) for the US and Svaleryd (2002) for Sweden. This paper contributes to this literature
by analyzing gender effects controlling for the class effect.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the institutional
context, the theoretical background and describes the data used. Section 3 explains the
identification strategy used. Section 4 shows the results obtained and Section 5 concludes.
2 Background and Data
2.1 Political Organization
India is a federal country, and the constitution gives a significant control of their own govern-
ment to the 28 states and 7 union territories. The State Legislative Assemblies are directly
elected bodies set up to carry out the administration of the government in the states of India.
State governments are those that mainly decide the educational policies and the expenditure
on education and have Education Departments, which are administrative bureaucracies to
control and implement these activities. Article 246 of the Constitution gives the Legislature of
any state powers to make laws dealing with the educational issues. Although education falls
into the Concurrent List (matters shared between the central and the state governments), the
states play the major role in educational policy, particularly at the primary and secondary
levels.
There are some evidences that female politicians may care about the education received by
children living in their constituencies in India. Pundir and Singh (2002) conducted a survey
of female legislators in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh and found that most of the female
legislators who were in power between 1952 and 1996 were able to open schools in their areas.
Moreover, some of them were also engaged in programs trying to improve education.
Given that the Indian districts have education offices, female politicians in the state govern-
ments could keep in close contact with these offices, and could influence the way expenditures
are made there. They could also decide to transfer more funds to one district, in particular,
if their constituency is located there.
The states and union territories are divided into single-member constituencies where can-
didates are elected in first-past-the-post elections. The boundaries of assembly constituencies
are drawn to make sure that there are, as near as practicable, the same number of inhabitants
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in each constituency. The assemblies vary in size according to state population. Districts are
the administration unit at the lower level from the state. Each district includes between one
and 37 constituencies. The median district has 9 electoral constituencies.
The Indian constitution (1950) provides political reservation for SC/STs. According to
articles 330 and 332 of the constitution, before every national and state election, a number of
jurisdictions will be reserved for these population groups. Both SC and ST tend to be socially
and economically disadvantaged, and they constitute approximately 25% of the total popula-
tion in India. Scheduled Tribe (ST) seats are reserved according to the concentration of ST
population in that particular constituency. Scheduled Caste (SC) seats are reserved according
to two standards: the concentration of SC population and the dispersal of reservations in a
given state.4
The Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order and the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order
1950 provide a list of SC/STs, respectively, for each Indian state. These lists have been
occasionally modified, but with little variation.
According to Article 341 of the Constitution, the SC are the "castes, races or tribes or
parts of or groups within castes, races or tribes deemed by public notification to be Scheduled
Castes by the President in relation to that state or union territory". According to Article
342, the ST are the "tribes or tribal communities or part of or groups within these tribes
and tribal communities which have been declared as such by the President through a public
notification".
ST are generally poor, have primitive ways of life, live in isolated areas, have a distinct
culture, and do not communicate much with the rest of the community. SC can not be served
by clean Brahmans, or by those who serve the high-caste Hindus, as they are believed to
pollute a high-caste Hindu by contact or proximity. They are prevented from using public
services, such as roads and schools, and are not treated as equal by high-caste men with the
same education5.
In 1992, the 73rd amendment to the Constitution of India established that one-third of
4There has almost never been a case in which an SC/ST legislator won a non-reserved seat. Thus, knowing
whether a seat is reserved or not, one can know the caste of the legislator who wins that seat.
5Source: Source: www.indianngos.com, Pande (2003) and Jain & Ratnam (1994). This is based on the
Census Report of 1931(1).
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seats in the Panchayat councils (rural local governments) and one-third of Pradhan positions
would be reserved for women. However, this was not the case in the State and Central Gov-
ernments. In September 1996, the government introduced a parliamentary bill that proposed
the reservation of one-third of the seats for women in the Central Government and the State
Assemblies. Since then, this proposal has been widely discussed in several parliamentary ses-
sions, without reaching an agreement. Women in India are underrepresented in all political
positions. Between 1967 and 2001 in the 16 main states, at most 14% of the general seats
and 24% of the seats reserved for SC/STs in the State Assemblies were won by a woman in a
given year and state. In Figure 1, the fraction of seats in each state won by women between
1967 and 2001 is plotted. This figure shows significant differences across states on both the
levels and trends of female representation. Figure 2 shows the fraction of constituencies in the
different districts won by a woman by state and election year. There is significant district-
time variation in female representation; even if for many district-year observations, the female
representation is zero.
2.2 Theoretical Background
The theoretical background for this study comes from two sources. First, some models support
the fact that the identity of the legislator matters for policy. Second, other models are able to
explain why legislators care about policies implemented in the areas where they are elected.
If candidates could commit to implement specific policies when elected and only cared
about winning the elections, political decisions should only reflect the preferences of the elec-
torate, (Downs (1957)). If this were the case, female political representation would not matter
for policy outcomes, because equilibrium policies would follow the preferences of the median
voter. Thus, as long as women could vote in the elections, their preferences would be repre-
sented by the candidate elected, irrespective of the gender of the candidate. The same would
apply to politicians belonging to a given caste. However, Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne
and Slivinski (1996) show how in the absence of complete policy commitment, the identity
of the legislator matters for policy determination, as increasing political representation of a
group would increase its influence in policy.
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According to this set of models, if politicians’ can not commit to implement a given set of
policies once in power, the gender and caste of a politician would matter for policy.
Several models explain why legislators direct funds to their own constituency and why
individual legislators may have preferences towards the type of policies applied in their con-
stituencies. Alesina (1988) shows how different parties may have different preferences because
they represent different constituencies and care about being elected and about the policies
they will implement once elected in their constituencies. Persson et al (2000) compare a par-
liamentary regime with a presidential-congressional regime and show how in a parliamentary
regime, if all agents are self-motivated, citizens delegate their decisions to their representatives
and political candidates cannot commit to policy platforms before the elections; there will be
more redistribution and public goods provision towards the citizens represented by the coali-
tion in government. In fact, they show how, as legislators value holding office, the threat of
not being again makes them perfect delegates for their constituencies. However, their power
to do so will depend on their bargaining power in the legislature. Grossman and Helpman
(2005) show how there may be conflicts of interest between political parties and individual
legislators. Once their party is in power, individual legislators will want to provide public
goods to their constituents, independent of the promises made by their political party. The
extent of this will depend on the degree of party discipline.
In India, state legislators are elected in single-member constituencies. India has been char-
acterized by a multiparty electoral system, the party who won more seats in the legislature
being the one who forms government, with or without other parties in the coalition. Politi-
cians in India represent the interests of their constituencies and may have incentives to provide
public goods or expenditure there. If Indian political parties face costs of enforcing “party
discipline”, then individual legislators may have the power to implement policies in their con-
stituencies, especially if they belong to the party with more seats in the legislature. According
to citizen-candidate models, in the absence of complete policy comittment, if politicians of
different identities have different preferences, then the type of expenditures and policies they
will conduct in their constituencies will be different. Thus, the gender and caste of politicians
may have an effect on the education and other public goods received in their constituency and
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possibly as well in the whole district (through the district administrative offices).
2.3 Data
The empirical analysis focuses on the causal relationship between the education received by an
individual and the identity of the politicians who were in power in his or her district when he
or she was young. To answer this question, I collected a unique dataset on Indian politicians
which was then combined with National Sample Survey data (NSS). This section describes
the data used and how the different data sources was combined.6
A very detailed dataset was collected on the State Legislatures in India during 1967-2001
from the pdf reports published by the Election Commission of India (ECI). The ECI provides
information at the constituency level of the candidate who won, whether he contested in a
SC/ST reserved constituency, his or her gender and political party. It also provides data on
all female candidates who contested for election, their political parties7 and the votes they
obtained. For female and male politicians who won against a candidate of the other gender,
the information was gathered regarding the runner-up in each particular election and regarding
the votes obtained by him/her. Overall, these data give information on 29686 politicians who
contested in the 16 larger states during 1967-2001.8
Each one of these candidates was elected in a single-member constituency and then occu-
pied a seat in the State Legislative Assembly. Given that each district has from 1 to 37 electoral
constituencies, then each district will have from 1 to 37 representatives in the Assembly.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the political variables used in this study. Female
political representation has been low over the time period under consideration: approximately
3.8% of the seats per district and electoral year. Approximately 25% of seats are reserved
for Scheduled Castes and Tribes and female representation in reserved seats is also low: ap-
proximately 3.7% of them are won by women. In addition, over this time period, Congress
held most of the seats, followed by Janata, Hindu, and Regional Parties. Within districts in
6For more detailed information on the variables used and the data sources see the data appendix.
7Details on the political parties and how are they grouped can be found in the Data Appendix.
8These 16 states account for more than 90 per cent of the total population in India, about 935 million
people. They are Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Jammu & Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala,
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajashtan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.
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which women won the elections, the majority of both women and men who won were from the
Congress party, followed by Janata, Hindu, and regional parties. Thus, female politicians do
not seem to be disproportionately representing a particular party, and all parties had female
candidates winning seats in elections.
I combine these data on politicians with data from the 55th round of the NSS. This is a
nationally representative household survey that provides information at the household and the
individual level. The survey was conducted in India between July 1999 and June 2000 on a
sample of randomly selected households. I use the Employment and Unemployment schedules
of the 55th round of the NSS. These contain information on 596688 individuals, 371188 in
rural areas and 225500 in urban areas.9
The NSS gives information on personal characteristics such as age, gender and whether
the individual is SC/ST. In addition, it provides information on the educational attainment
of each individual. This information is used to create a variable that is equal to one if the
individual completed primary education through formal education.10
Panel A in Table 2 gives descriptive statistics on several characteristics of the individuals in
the sample used, classified by urban/rural status. A total of 37.8% of women and 61.3% of men
living in rural areas completed primary education, whereas in urban areas they were 74.7%
and 79.1% respectively. Thus, educational attainment is much lower and gender differences
are much larger in rural areas. Differences between general and SC/ST individuals are also
larger in rural than in urban areas.
Because the NSS data only provides information on individual residence up to the district
level and the politicians are elected in constituencies, which are smaller in size than districts,
to merge the two datasets the electoral data is aggregated up to the district level.
This is not a trivial task. To know which constituencies are included in each district for each
electoral year, different constituency delimitation orders and the publications “State Elections
in India”, which lists the constituencies that are included in each district in each election year
9The NSS uses the Indian Census definition of urban and rural areas.
10I then only consider individuals who attended formal education courses in my sample. Those who ob-
tained education as adults are then considered as uneducated since they did not pass the primary standard
examination when they were young. Nevertheless, there are only 987 individuals in these category, and results
do not change after dropping these individuals from the sample.
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are used. Some districts have divided, have been newly created or have disappeared during
the time period under consideration. The 1991 census district definition is then used and
only those districts that did not split or disappear were included. Those districts which were
newly created between 1967 and 2001 and those which include constituencies belonging to
another neighboring district at the same time are not considered11. This procedure allows the
aggregation of the electoral data into districts and to have information on 276 districts that
include nearly 2761 electoral constituencies12.
The electoral dataset is merged with the NSS data by district of residence and by the year
in which each individual started primary school13. Thus, using information on the year each
individual was born and his or her district of birth, one can know which politicians where in
power before he or she started primary school.
For those individuals who migrated, the NSS does not provide information regarding the
district of origin. Because an individual who migrated from another district after this age will
not have benefited from the educational policies applied in the district where he is migrated,
those who migrated after schooling age from another district, state or country are eliminated
from the sample. Those who migrated from rural to urban areas or vice versa within the same
district are also eliminated, because the educational policies and inputs may be different in
rural than in urban areas14.
Because primary school lasts for four or five years, depending on the state of residence
and also because individuals usually start schooling at the age of six and finish at the age
of 10-1115, I restrict the sample to those individuals who were older than 13 at the time of
the survey. This procedure takes into account differences across states and it also takes into
11Some constituencies straddle a district bound.
12There are around 463 districts in the 16 biggest states in India. District characteristics for the districts
included in the sample are not very different from the excluded ones. Results available from the author on
request.
13I consider it to be 6 years of age. The NSS provides information about an individual’s age and the time
the individual was interviewed. Since the individual could have been sampled either in 1999 or 2000 and this
sample year is given by the NSS, I take this into account when I compute the age at which an individual
started primary school.
14Even if migration in India is generally low, migration is higher for women, because sometimes they move
outside their district to get married. However, women who migrated at marriage do not display very different
educational levels than the rest. Results available from the author upon request.
15Depending on the State. The Appendix provides more information on this.
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account the fact that some individuals may have to repeat entire years and thus finish their
education later.
The resulting sample size is 105208 individuals. The availability of political data allows me
to include only individuals born after 1964 in the sample and the survey allows me to include
individuals born before 1987 . Thus, political data from 1967-1992 is used to be merged with
the individual data. With this information I can exploit variation across districts and cohorts,
as different individuals in a cohort will have lived in different districts and thus, because
politicians change over district and over time will have been exposed to different politicians.
I assign the politicians who were in power during the three years before he or she started
primary education to each individual in the sample. Panel A in Table 3 gives an example of
how the data is organized: individual 1, who lives in district A and was born in 1964, should
have started primary education in 1970, which means that the politicians in his or her district
that could have had an effect on his or her education will be those in power between 1967
and 1969, before he or she started primary education. Thus, for this individual, three-year
averages of the political variables (between 1967 and 1969) are taken16.
3 Identification
The key identification challenge is to estimate the causal effect of the identity of politicians
on education, by separating this effect from the effect of unobservable variables that drive
both education and female representation. To illustrate this, assume that one estimates the
equation:
Yidt = α+ βFdt + εidt
Where Yidt is the educational outcome for individual i, living in district d and born in
cohort t and Fdt is the fraction of constituencies in the district held by female politicians
during the three years before individual i started primary education. The coefficient β would
not be consistently estimated by OLS if there is an omitted variable Qdt, not included in the
16Results are robust to taking longer time-periods, i.e. 6, 9 and 12 years, as a reference. This is available
from the author on request.
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model and correlated with Fdt.
The omitted variable could be electoral preferences in the district, which may be correlated
both with female political representation and with educational attainments in the district.
Even if district fixed effects are included in the regression, these control only for permanent
differences across districts in female representation and the outcome variables, but one can
not rule out the fact that the omitted variable Qdt may be district-specific and may change
over time.
To identify the causal effect of female politicians, I take advantage of the existence of close
elections between a female and a male candidate. Close elections are elections in which the vote
difference between the winner and the runner-up is very small. The identification strategy used
in this paper follows the same idea as the regression discontinuity design. This methodology
has been widely used and has been first introduced in the context of elections by Lee (2001)
for incumbency advantage and by Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) for the effect of party control on
fiscal policies. In the field of development economics, Miguel and Zaidi (2003) use regression
discontinuity to test for the “Patronage” hypothesis in Ghana. Regression discontinuity has
also been used as an instrument by Angrist and Lavy (1999) to estimate the effect of class size
on educational achievements and by Rehavi (2003), who uses close elections between women
and men in the US as an instrument to estimate the effect of female politicians on expenditures
at the state level.
In the same spirit, to identify the causal effect of female politicians, I use the fraction of
constituencies in the district won by a woman in a close election against a man as an instrument
for the fraction of constituencies in the district won by a female politician. The reason why
the instrument is valid is that female candidates who barely win the elections against a man
do it in constituencies where there is no clear “preference for female politicians”, as the male
politician could have won the election as well. These constituencies will be ex ante comparable
to constituencies in which male candidates win in a close election against a woman.
The fact that a candidate is elected in first-past-the-post elections held in single-member
constituencies is a function of the vote difference between the winner and the runner-up. This
function has a discontinuity when the vote difference is zero; this is the case because the
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winner has to receive more votes than the runner-up to win the election. Thus, the fact that
the candidate is elected or not changes discontinuously as this vote difference is zero. In
elections in which the winner and the runner-up have different genders, as the vote difference
becomes smaller and approaches the discontinuity, constituencies in which the vote difference
is very small and a woman won will be more and more similar to constituencies in which the
vote difference is very small and a man won. This discontinuity at the zero vote difference will
provide a randomized treatment.
Thus, in elections in which the winner and the runner-up have different genders, when
the difference in votes is very small, the gender of the winner will be randomized. This
randomization implies that constituencies in which a woman won in a close election against a
man and constituencies in which a man won in a close election against a woman will be similar
in all the unobservable variables, and they will only differ in the fact that by chance either a
man or a woman won the election. I define close elections as elections in which the difference
of the votes between the winner and the runner-up is less than 3.5% of the total votes in that
particular constituency.17
Figure 3 shows that there is a significant variation in the fraction of constituencies that
had close elections between women and men in each district and electoral year by state. In the
sample used in this study 136 district-electoral years had close elections between women and
men, while 1836 did not. Panel B in Table 3 shows how individuals in the sample are classified
according to whether there were close elections between men and women in their district during
the three years before they started primary education. There are several constituencies in each
district, which means that an individual will be affected by a close election if there is a close
election in his or her district of residence. This table shows that 12% of individuals in the
sample were living in a district where close elections between men and women took place
when they were young: 48.7% of them in districts where more men won in close elections than
women, 3.2% in districts where the same number of women and men won in close elections,
and 47.8% in districts where more women won in close elections than men. Thus, as expected,
17In order to use close elections as an instrument I need to choose a cut-off point to define elections that
are close. I chose 3.5% in order to have a sufficient number of close elections and because a 3.5% difference is
sufficiently close zero. I perform the same exercise with smaller margins and results are unchanged (see the
Placebos and Robustness section).
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there is nearly the same fraction of individuals affected by men winning in close elections as
by women winning in close elections.
The model to be estimated is
Yidt = θd + ψt + βFdt + λTCdt +Xidtη + Zdtδ + εidt (1)
Fdt = θd + ψt + κFCdt + µTCdt +Xdtσ + Zdtς + udt (2)
In equation (1), Yidt takes the value of 1 if individual i belonging to cohort t and born in
district d has obtained at least primary education and it takes 0, otherwise. I estimate the
model using two-stage least squares, where equation (1) is the second stage and equation (2)
is the first stage. Because observations in the same district could be correlated, I compute
the standard errors clustered at the district level. Regressions are weighted using the weights
provided by the NSS.
The main variable of interest is Fdt, which is is the fraction of constituencies in the district
that were won by a female politician during the three years before individual i started primary
education. The instrument for this variable is FCdt, the fraction of constituencies in the district
won by a woman in a close election against a man during the same time period. I control for
TCdt, which is the fraction of constituencies in the district in which there were close elections
between women and men, as well during the same time period. The fraction of constituencies
that had close elections between men and women controls for the fact that the existence of
this type of elections may not be a random event. However, the outcome of a close election is
random, meaning that the gender of the winner in close elections between women and men is
random as well. In other words, the effect of the existence of close elections between women
and men on education is controlled by in equation (1) and partialled out of the instrument in
equation (2).
θd are district fixed effects, which account for district-specific characteristics that do not
change over time. ψt are the cohort fixed effects, which account for the fact that individuals
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born in different years may have been exposed to different shocks or nationwide educational
policies. Xidt is a vector of individual-level control variables. Zdt are the set of other controls
at the district level that vary over time and may have an effect on the dependent variable.
These controls are discussed in the later sections.
In the appendix, I shown several facts that support the validity of the identification strategy
used. First, I have provided some evidence supporting the fact that the outcome of a close
election is indeed random, in the sense that it cannot be predicted by observables at the
district level. Second, I have shown that the districts in which more female candidates won in
close elections against men are similar in observables to those in which more male candidates
won in close elections against women. Third, I have shown that female and male candidates
who won in close elections against a candidate of the other gender receive the same percentage
of votes, tend to be the incumbent with the same probability, and win in constituencies where
electoral turnout, the number of close elections that took place in the past and the number of
other female candidates contesting for the same seat, are the same. Finally, I have provided
evidence that districts that had close elections between men and women are not systematically
different from other districts in India. Districts that had more close elections between male
and female candidates could be different from other districts as they would have more female
candidates contesting elections, this is the reason why I control for TCdt in specifications (1)
and (2). The fact that they are quite similar than the rest further supports the external
validity of the results obtained18.
The dependent variable is a binary response variable, thus specification (1 ) is a linear
probability model. One could then obtain fitted values that are outside the unit interval.
However, Wooldridge(2002) states that estimating a linear probability model by 2SLS when
there are continuous endogenous explanatory variables would provide a good estimation of the
average effect, as it would still be a consistent and unbiased estimator.
For the main specifications, I compare the results from the linear probability model with
the results obtained using a probit model with continuous endogenous explanatory variables,
18In the appendix I could not exploit time variation due to lack of data. As differences in districts that
have close elections and districts that do not have them could change over time I add TCdt as a control in the
regressions.
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estimated with conditional maximum likelihood. This has to be done under the assumption
that the error terms are independently and identically distributed multivariate normal for all
observations.
4 Results
4.1 Baseline Results
4.1.1 The Effect of Female Legislators on Education
Results for the basic econometric specification are shown in Table 4. The dependent variable
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual obtained at least primary education and is 0
otherwise; the coefficient reported is the one corresponding to the proportion of constituencies
in the district held by female politicians during the three years before an individual started
primary education.
OLS results in columns (1)-(3) show that female representation is positively and signifi-
cantly correlated with the probability that an individual attains primary education. When
the sample is divided between those who live in urban and those who live in rural areas, the
correlation is positive in both cases, see columns (2) and (3).
2SLS estimates in columns (4)-(6) show a very different picture, the female representation
effect is now only significant for the urban sample, and it is larger, see column (5). The
magnitude of this coefficient implies that by increasing female representation in the district by
10 percentage points, the probability that an individual attains primary education in an urban
area increases by 6 percentage points, which is approximately 8% of the total probability that
an individual obtains primary education in an urban area. Given that being a woman reduces
the probability of attaining primary education by 6 percentage points and being SC/ST reduces
it by 18 percentage points, this is considered as an important magnitude19. Columns (7)-(9)
show results for the probit with endogenous regressors20. The coefficients reported are the
average marginal effects. Results for this specification are very similar to the 2SLS results, so
19These coefficients are not reported in Table 4, but are available from the author on request.
20Using ivprobit in Stata.
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I choose 2SLS as my preferred specification.
The first stage regression for this specification is shown in the first column of Table 5.
Results show how the fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman in a close
election against a man is indeed a very good predictor of the fraction of constituencies in the
district won by a woman. Holding the fraction of constituencies won by men who won in close
elections against a woman constant, increasing the fraction of constituencies won by women
in close elections against men by 1 percentage point would increase female representation by
0.9 percentage points2122.
In these regressions, I control for individual characteristics. Because rural areas are likely
to have lower literacy levels and educational inputs, a dummy for rural areas captures this
effect. As caste, gender, and religion may be important determinants in the education of an
individual, I also include dummies that indicate whether the individual is a woman, Hindu or
Muslim, and whether the individual is an SC/ST.
To disentangle the identity of the legislator’s effect from the political parties’ effect, I
include the average fraction of seats won by the different political parties in each district the
three years before the individual started primary education as control variables. If female
politicians have a differential effect compared with male politicians after controlling for party
composition, this indicates that the results will be given by gender and not by party differences.
As in Besley and Burgess (2002), I use seven main party groups: Congress, Hard Left, Soft
Left, Janata, Hindu, Regional parties, and independents together with other small parties. I
also include the fraction of SC/ST reserved seats in the district as a control variable, because
this may also have an effect on the nature of political competition in each district.
I control for other variables that vary across districts and over time. I include female and
male literacy rates to account for the fact that in districts were there are more literates, the
preferences of the electorate may be different. In addition, it may as well be that in districts
21The coefficient for the fraction of elections that are close elections between women and men is -0.3185 with
a standard error of 0.0144.
22Both the instrument and the female representation variable vary at the district and cohort level, even if
the dependent variable is at the individual level. When running the first stage regression at the district and
year level without individual variables the coefficient for the fraction of constituencies in the district won by
a woman in a close election against a man is 1.2025, with a standard error or 0.1992. Results for the pooled
second stage regression are 0.4966 with a standard error of 0.2884 in urban areas and -0.0201 with a standard
error of 0.1838 in rural areas.
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where literacy rates are higher, parents are more likely to bring their children to school. I
have also included the share of SC/ST, and urban and female population in the regression,
because they may also have an effect on both educational and electoral outcomes. Descriptive
statistics for these variables are shown in Panel B of Table 2. For these control variables, I
use information on district characteristics three years before the individual started primary
education to account for the situation the legislator had in a particular district23.
Discussion Results show that female politicians have a significantly larger effect on the edu-
cation obtained by individuals living in urban areas of their own district than male politicians
(the reference category). However, this is not the case in rural areas.
2SLS coefficients are larger than the OLS coefficients. The fact that the OLS coefficients
are downward biased suggests that the omitted variable is positively correlated with female
representation and negatively correlated with education (or vice versa). For example, if female
politicians are known to be effective for educational improvements, then in areas where edu-
cational levels are low, they will tend to elect female politicians. Another possibility is that in
very backward areas, where educational levels are very low, they elect female representatives
because they are the family member of an important male politician, or they belong to one of
the “elite” families in power. Bias for the rural sample is smaller; even if the 2SLS coefficient
is very imprecisely estimated, OLS and 2SLS coefficients are very similar. This implies that
by running the regressions with OLS, the fact that the effect of female representation in urban
and rural areas is very different cannot be distinguished.
If both female and male politicians implement their own preferences when they are in
power,24 then it is reasonable to assume that these politicians will care about the needs of
those who share their identity. One possible explanation for the results obtained is that, if
female politicians care about empowering those who share their identity, then they would
choose to invest in education in urban areas as returns for women are higher there than in
23Details on these variables can be found in the data appendix.
24In fact, if there are two types of citizen-candidate, women and men, and they have different preferences,
once they decide to contest for election and win they will implement their own preferences. This will be true
if they can not commit to implement a specific policy ex ante, which is likely to be the case in India. If
politicians are self-interested, they will try to improve their economic opportunities, which will coincide with
the economic opportunities of their groups.
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rural areas; hence demand for women’s education is higher25.
I have computed wage differentials for working women older than 15 with and without
primary education. Data for these variables are shown in Panel A of Table 2. In urban
areas, the wage of an educated woman is 3.5 times the wage of an uneducated woman. In
rural areas, the wage of an educated woman is 1.5 times the wage received by an uneducated
woman. Thus, the difference in wages between educated and non-educated women is much
larger in urban areas. In addition, educated women living in rural areas will have to take
opportunities to work in non-farm employment in rural areas, because their mobility may be
reduced by social constraints. In urban areas, women can take advantage of more opportunities
to work in activities that require their education skills (see Chadha 1997). Table 2 shows that
in urban areas, 95% of working women with primary education work in the nonagricultural
sector, whereas this is only 29% in rural areas. These facts may explain why education is
more important for women in urban than in rural areas. In contrast, men can benefit from
education both in rural and urban areas. In fact, in urban areas, the wage of an educated man
is 1.9 times the wage of an uneducated man, whereas in rural areas, it is 1.5 times the wage of
an educated man, so the difference between rural and urban areas is smaller than for women.
Taking into account that men have higher mobility than women and that they can always
move to work in urban areas, they will have more opportunities than women in rural areas.
Thus, if they become educated they will be more able to take advantage of their skills.26 27
Placebos and Robustness In this section, I provide evidence supporting the identification
strategy used in this study by performing two placebo tests and some checks on the main
specification.
The primary education attainment of an individual should be determined by the policies
25In rural areas they may invest in different public goods (for example, access to roads or drinking and water
facilities), which are more valuable to women there.
26Kochar (2004) finds that urban returns to education have a positive impact on boys education living in
rural areas. This is especially the case for landless households. In the limit, and, if there was perfect mobility,
returns to education could be equal for men in rural and urban areas, but she shows how this does not seem
to be the case.
27Berhman, Foster, Rosenzweig and Vashishtha (1999) do not find labour market returns to schooling for
women in rural areas, which is consistent with the explanation provided here.
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applied by the politicians in power in the district where the individual was living before
he or she started primary education,28 but should not be determined by policies applied by
politicians who were in power when he or she finished primary education or by politicians who
were in power somewhere else when these individuals were young. The fact that timing is so
crucial for primary education can be used to perform two placebo tests.
I first use data on individuals who migrated from other districts or who migrated within the
same district between rural and urban areas29 after the age of 14. Individuals who migrated to
the area when they were too old to achieve primary education can be used to perform a placebo
test because they could not be affected by the policies applied by the female legislators who
were in power there when they were young. Because primary school ends when an individual
is 11 years old and because an individual aged 14 should be in secondary school, one should
not observe any effect from female politicians on these individuals. For each individual, I use
political characteristics and control variables corresponding to the new district of residence
when the individual was 3-5 years as right hand side variables. Model (1)-(2) is then run on
these individuals, using the same first stage as before. Results are shown in columns (1) and
(2) of Table 6. Column (1) shows results for the urban sample. In this case, the sample size is
much smaller, but the effect of female politicians on individuals who arrived in the area when
they were too old to achieve primary education is very small and not significant. The effect
in rural areas is as well not significant, see column (2).
Similarly, there should be no effect on individuals who have always lived in the district
but who were too old to be affected by the policies applied by female politicians when they
were in power. To conduct the second test, the politicians’ data is combined with the data
on individuals who were aged from 14 to 16 when the female politicians were in power30.
The same exercise is done for these individuals. Results are shown in columns (3) and (4)
of Table 6. In column (3), I restrict the sample to individuals living in urban areas. As
before, the sample is much smaller, but female representatives do not have any effect on these
individuals. Moreover, the coefficient is negative and much smaller than that obtained for
28Or maybe even during his or her first years of primary education.
29Since policies are different in urban than in rural areas, an individual who migrated from a rural to an
urban area will not have been affected in the same way as the “urban” individuals. Thus, it is a valid placebo.
30As before, this individuals should be in secondary schooling age.
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younger individuals. As it is shown in column (4), female representatives do not have any
effect on individuals living in rural areas. Results of these two placebo tests are reassuring, as
they confirm that the female representation variable is not proxying for another variable.
In the main specification, I define close elections as elections in which the vote difference
between the winner and the runner-up is less than 3.5%. Here I check whether results are
sensitive to this choice of vote margin. In columns (5)-(8) of Table 6, I test whether results
are the same when close elections are defined as those in which the winner won the runner-up
by smaller margins. In particular, in columns (5) and (6), I use a 3% margin as a cutoff point,
whereas in columns (7) and (8), I use a 2.5% margin. Then I run the 2SLS specification as
before. Now, however, the instrument will be defined in a different way, because some elections
that were considered close before will not be considered now as such. Results for the urban
and rural samples are very similar to those obtained in the previous section. The coefficient
for the effect of female politicians in urban areas seems to increase slightly as the margin is
reduced, but it is still in the same confidence interval as the coefficient for the 3.5% margin.
The probability that an individual attains primary education in a state or district may
change across generations, in fact, it may increase over time. If female representation also
trends upward, results obtained may be capturing this trend. Because elections are held at
the state level, different states may have different trends. In addition, different districts may
have different trends in both educational attainments and the right-hand side variables. In
columns (9) and (10) of Table 6 I control for the existence of state-specific trends. Results
remain unchanged. In addition, in columns (11) and (12) of Table 6, I include district-specific
trends in the regression. Reassuringly, results are also very similar to the ones obtained before.
4.1.2 The Effect of SC/ST and General Female Legislators
India provides the unique opportunity to analyze both the gender and the caste effect of
politicians, which has not been previously analyzed. I take advantage of the fact that some
seats in the State Assemblies are reserved for the SC/STs. SC/ST women are part of a socially
and economically disadvantaged group, and may have different preferences from the rest.
Taking advantage of this reservation, one can compare the female politicians who contested
23
for SC/ST reserved seats to female politicians who contested for unreserved (or general) seats.
Considering SC/ST and general female legislators separately, one can then disentangle gender
from caste effects. For all social groups, primary education is correlated with higher wages and
household expenditure (see Figures 4 and 5), thus, education could potentially be beneficial
for all citizens, irrespective of their caste.
If the cost of running for elections is higher for female than for male candidates, then female
legislators would belong to richer economic backgrounds than male legislators. If this is the
case, the gender effect could be contaminated by an "economic background" effect. SC/ST
individuals are in general poorer than the rest, thus, if SC/ST female representatives have an
effect on education, this will indicate that the coefficients obtained before are driven by gender
differences, not by class differences between male and female politicians.
The female representation variable is divided according to whether female politicians con-
tested for an SC/ST reserved seat or not. The specification that is going to be tested will
then be:
Yidt = θd + ψt + β1Fscstdt + β2Fgendt + λTCdt +Xidtη + Zdtδ + εidt (3)
Where the fraction of constituencies won by SC/ST women in a close election against an
SC/ST man is used as an instrument for Fscstdt, the fraction of constituencies won by SC/ST
women. Similarly, the fraction of constituencies won in a close election by a general woman
against a general man is used as an instrument for Fgendt, the fraction of constituencies won
by general women31.
Table 7 shows the results for the regressions in which the female representatives are divided
according to whether they contested for an SC/ST reserved seat or not. In columns (1),(2),
and (3), the OLS results for the whole sample, urban and rural individuals are reported,
respectively. The coefficients for the fraction of constituencies in the district won by SC/ST
female politicians and the fraction of constituencies in the district won by general female
politicians is also reported. Results show a positive correlation between general female political
31SC/ST reservations are decided according to these groups’ populations. As before, I add as a control in
the regressions the fraction of seats reserved for these groups and the fraction of the population they represent.
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representation and education in urban areas. However, as before, these results could be
contaminated by omitted variable bias.
First-stage regressions for the 2SLS specification are shown in Table 5. The fraction of
constituencies in the district won in a close election by an SC/ST female politician against an
SC/ST male politician is a very good predictor of the fraction of constituencies in the district
won by an SC/ST female politician. The analogous is true for general female politicians. The
cross-coefficients are also significant, but are smaller32.
2SLS estimates of this specification are shown in columns (4)-(6) of Table 7. Results for
the whole sample show that neither SC/ ST nor general female representatives have an effect
on primary education attainment. In contrast, in urban areas, SC/ST female representatives
have a positive and significant effect on the probability that an individual attains primary
education. The coefficient for general female representatives is marginally insignificant, but is
not statistically different from the one for SC/ST female representatives, even if it is smaller in
magnitude. In fact, results in column (5) show that by increasing SC/ST female representation
by 10 percentage points, the probability that an individual attains primary education in an
urban area increases by 12.9 percentage points, which is 16.6% of the total probability that an
individual attains primary education in an urban area. When only the sample of individuals
who live in rural areas is considered, the effect of both general and SC/ST female politicians
is not significant; see column (6).
Columns (7)-(9) report results for the specifications in which the second stage is estimated
as a probit. For these specifications, the average marginal effects are reported. Results for
these three specifications are very similar to those obtained before, even if now the coefficient
for the effect of general female politicians in urban areas is significant. For simplicity, and
32Since variation both in the instruments and the endogenous variables is at the district and year level, even
if I use NSS weights in the individual regressions I should check whether results remain running the regressions
at the district and year level, without controlling for individual characteristics. The first stage results are as
well very similar. In the regression for SC/ST female politicians, the coefficient for SC/ST female politicians
who won in close elections is 0.9825, with a standard error of 0.0448. In the regression for general female
politicians, the coefficient for general female politicians who won in close elections is 1.1312, with a standard
error of 0.0577. Moreover, coefficients for the second stage are as well very similar, whether I run the regression
at the district level or at the individual level: in urban areas SC/ST female politicians have a coefficient of
1.008 with a standard error of 0.4315 and general female politicians politicians 0.2788 with a standard error
of 0.3330. In rural areas SC/ST female politicians have a coefficient of -0.1883 with a standard error of 0.4132
and general female politicians have a coefficient of 0.0651 with a standard error of 0.2170.
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given that results with a probit are very similar to the results for 2SLS, the latter is chosen
as my preferred specification.
Division of female legislators between SC/ST and general helps in identifying the effects
of class, which may be confused with gender. In other words, SC/ST women will surely have
a lower class background than the rest, and however, they still have a significant effect on
the education received by individuals living in urban areas. In fact, their effect is stronger
than the effect of female politicians obtained without taking the caste of the politicians into
account. In conclusion, results in Table 7 are reassuring, because they indicate that results
for female representatives obtained before were indeed driven by gender and not by class.
Perceived returns to education may be higher for SC/ST female politicians than for general
female politicians if their education, together with caste reservations allowed them to cross
the caste barriers and enter them into politics; this may be one of the reasons why their effect
on education is higher.
4.1.3 Effects of the Gender and Caste of the Politician on Individuals who Share
their Identity.
This subsection aims to determine whether politicians tend to favor those who share their
same identity, as defined by gender and caste, in policymaking. To do this, individuals are
matched with politicians according to their identities. If female politicians promote policies
that favour women’s needs, they should increase girls’ education. However, due to spillover
effects boys’ education could increase as well.
The first objective would be to estimate whether the effect of female politicians on the
education received by girls is larger than their effect on the education received by boys, by
matching female politicians with women and men who were living in the districts where these
politicians were elected when they were young. This is done in specification (4):
Yidt = θd + ψt + βgirlidt ∗ Fdt + γboyidt ∗ Fdt + λTCdt +Xidtη + Zdtδ + εidt (4)
Fdt is interacted with a dummy variable that is equal to one if the individual is a girl:
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girlidt and another variable that is equal to one if the individual is a boy: boyidt. As before,
the fraction of seats in the district won by a female politician in a close election against a man
is used as an instrument for the fraction of seats in the district won by a female politician 33.
Results are reported in Table 8. Given that results for the whole sample were never
significant in the previous sections, I only report results for urban and rural areas separately.
Results for the urban sample are shown in Panel A, whereas results for the rural sample are
shown in Panel B. Horizontal lines separate different regressions.
In the first row of both panels, the coefficients reported are those for the fraction of con-
stituencies in the district won by a woman interacted with two dummy variables: one that
is equal to one if the individual affected is a girl and another one that is equal to one if the
individual affected is a boy. The computed difference between these two coefficients is also
reported. Results in the first row of Panel A indicate that female politicians have a positive
effect on the education of both girls and boys; the coefficient for the effect on girls is 50%
larger in magnitude than the one for the effect on boys, although the difference between these
two coefficients is not significant. This difference in magnitudes may be due to the fact that
women have lower primary education attainments than men to start with, or may be due to
the fact that female politicians promote educational policies that increase girls’ education but
that also have spillover effects on boys. In Panel B, results for individuals living in rural areas
are reported, here neither girls nor boys are affected by female politicians.
Given that SC/ST female legislators were those who had a larger effect on education in
urban areas, the caste dimension is then taken into account to compare female politicians
who contested for SC/ST reserved seats with female politicians who contested for unreserved
(general) seats, and their effect is analyzed on individuals of different identitites.
To estimate the effect of both SC/ST and general female politicians on individuals of
different identities, the female representation variables are interacted with dummy variables
that will be equal to one if the individual belongs to a particular identity group. Thus,
ident
j
idtbeing equal to one indicates that individual i, born in district d and in cohort t has
identity j. Dummies for gender, caste or gender and caste of the individuals, which are
33In the first stage the instrument is also interacted with the dummy variables.
27
mutually exclusive, are used as identity variables. In this specification, the controls used are
those used in the previous subsection, and include identjidt. The specification that is going to
be tested will then be:
Yidt = θd + ψt +
∑
j
β
1j(ident
j
idt ∗ Fscstdt) +
∑
j
β
2j(ident
j
idt ∗ Fgendt) +
+λTCdt +Xidtη + Zdtδ + εidt (5)
As before, the fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman in a close election
against a man is used as an instrument for the fraction of constituencies in the district won
by a woman. It is done both for women who won in reserved seats (SC/ST) and for women
who won in nonreserved seats (general seats)34.
It is first analyzed whether both SC/ST and general female politicians favor women more
than men, by increasing the probability that a girl attains primary education more than the
probability that a boy attains primary education. Results in the second rows of Panel A
and B show the coefficients of the effect of SC/ST and general female politicians on girls and
boys, for the urban and rural sample, respectively. The coefficients reported correspond to
the interaction between the fraction of seats in the district won by an SC/ST (general) female
politician, with two dummy variables, one that indicates whether the individual is a girl and
another one that indicates whether the individual is a boy. The computed difference among
the coefficients on girls and boys are also reported, both for SC/ST and for general female
legislators.
Results show that both SC/ST and general female politicians have a positive effect on
the probability that girls attain primary education in urban areas, while their effect on boys
is not significant. By increasing SC/ST female representation by 10 percentage points, the
probability that a girl living in an urban area attains primary education increases by 15 per-
centage points, whereas by increasing general female representation by 10 percentage points,
the probability that a girl attains primary education in an urban area increases by 5 percentage
34In order to estimate the model, the representation variables are interacted in the second and the first
stages with the identity dummies.
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points35. Consistently with results in Table 7, the effect of SC/ST female politicians on girls
is larger than the effect of general female politicians. The coefficients on the effect on girls and
boys are not significantly different, neither for general nor for SC/ST female politicians. Panel
B shows that in rural areas the effect is not significant, neither for girls nor for boys. Thus
far, results show that both general and SC/ST female politicians increase girls’ education in
urban areas. Even if the educational gender gap is not reduced, their effect on boys is not
significant. Because the reference category are male politicians, results indicate that both
general and SC/ST female politicians increase girls’ education more than male politicians.
Given that SC/ST individuals attain primary education with lower probability than general
individuals, then it is also interesting to see whether female politicians increase education for
individuals of their own caste group. Results are shown in the third rows of panels A and B,
for the urban and rural sample, respectively. In urban areas, SC/ST female politicians have a
positive effect on SC/ST individuals, whereas general female politicians have a positive effect
on general individuals. In fact, by increasing SC/ST female representation by 10 percentage
points, the probability that an SC/ST individual attains primary education increases by 28
percentage points, which is 42% of the probability that an SC/ST individual attains primary
education in an urban area. In addition, this coefficient is significantly different than the effect
on general individuals. By increasing general female representation by 10 percentage points,
the probability that a general individual attains primary education increases by 5.6 percentage
points, 6.9% of the probability that a general individual attains primary education in an urban
area. This coefficient is not significantly different from the one for SC/ST individuals, even if
the latter is much smaller. This is the case because the latter is not precisely estimated.
In rural areas, SC/ST female politicians have a negative effect on the probability that
SC/ST individuals attain primary education. Because the reference group is men, this means
that SC/ST female politicians have a lower effect on education in rural areas than male
politicians (the reference category), even after controlling for the fraction of seats in the district
that are reserved for SC/STs. SC/ST female politicians do not affect general individuals.
General female politicians do not have an effect on individuals living in rural areas, irrespective
35The probability that a woman obtains primary education in an urban area is 74.7%.
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of their caste.
Female politicians seem to induce educational policies that favor individuals of their gender
and caste in urban areas. Because women benefit more from education in urban than in rural
areas, the fact that female politicians benefit individuals of their same caste in urban areas
but not in rural areas may indicate that they target individuals of their gender and caste.
To confirm this later statement, in the fourth row of Panels A and B results in which the
female representation variables are interacted with four different dummy variables are shown:
for SC/ST girls, SC/ST boys, general girls and general boys. This allows the identification
of the effect of SC/ST and general female politicians on the different groups. In urban areas,
SC/ST female politicians have a positive effect on the probability that both SC/ST girls
and boys achieve primary education. Moreover, they also affect positively the probability
that general girls achieve primary education. The coefficients for SC/ST girls and boys are
not significantly different, but they are both different from the coefficients for general girls
and boys. These results confirm that SC/ST female politicians target educational policies
to individuals of their own group: women and the SC/STs. In fact, a 10 percentage points
increase in the proportion of seats won by SC/ST female politicians increases the probability
that SC/ST girls achieve primary education by 30 percentage points, which is a very large
magnitude compared with the average probability of achieving primary education.
General female politicians also target their own group in policymaking, as they have a
positive effect on the probability that general girls achieve primary education. However, this
coefficient is not significantly different from the coefficient for SC/ST girls and boys and general
boys, as these are not precisely estimated. As expected, results in panel B show no effect on
individuals living in rural areas.
Even if results in the first row of Panel A could suggest that female politicians increase
both girls and boys’ educational attainment and their effect is larger on girls as they start
from lower levels of education; this is contradicted by results in the third and fourth rows,
where results suggest a targetting of policies towards the same caste and gender groups of the
female politicians, and by the fact that general female politicians do not have an effect on
SC/ST individuals, which start from lower levels of education.
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4.2 Measures of Political Influence
With respect to the interpretation that female politicians affect education because they act on
policies, in this section, I check whether the effect of female representation is stronger when
they are more influential, either within the district or in the legislature. This is specially
important, as I do not have data on educational inputs at the district level36, and it could be
argued that the identity of the politician has an effect on education because they act as a role
model for people living in their constituencies, not because of the policies they implement.
4.2.1 Does Being A Member of the Majority Party Matter?
A legislator will have more power to implement policies or to direct funds to his or her own
constituency if he or she has more bargaining power within the legislature. This is likely to
be the case if he or she belongs to the party that has the majority of seats in the legislature.
Thus, if the effects observed are because of the actions of the politician, one should observe
that female legislators who belong to the party that won the majority in the state have a
stronger effect than the rest. To test this, the female politicians are divided based on the
criterion whether they belong to the party that had the majority of seats in the state or not.
The specification used is then:
Yidt = θd + ψt + β1F1dt + β2F2dt + λTCdt +Xidtη + Zdtδ + εidt (6)
Where F1dt, the fraction of constituencies won by women of the main party is instrumented
with the fraction of constituencies won by women of the main party in a close election against
a man. Similarly, F2dt, the fraction of constituencies won by women belonging to other parties
is instrumented with the fraction of constituencies won by women belonging to other parties
against men37.
Results are shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 9, for the urban and rural samples
respectively. In urban areas, women who belong to the party who got the majority of seats in
36I only have data for some years.
37The empirical strategy adopted here is analogous to the one in subsubsection 4.1.2., the difference is that
now I divide female representatives according to whether they belong to the main party in the legislature or
not.
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the state are those who have an effect, whereas the coefficient for women belonging to other
parties is not significant. For the rural sample, none of the coefficients is significant38.
4.2.2 Does District Size Matter?
If the effects on education are caused by the actions of the politicians, one should observe
that the effect of female politicians is larger in districts with fewer constituencies. This is
the case because if legislators are more sensitive to the demands of their constituencies, they
will be expected to have a larger effect on people living in the constituency where they were
elected, more than on the district as a whole. In smaller districts, estimates of the effect of
the legislator will be more accurate, and they will be a better approximation of the effect of
the identity of the legislator on people living in his or her constituency. In contrast, in larger
districts, the estimates of the differential effect of female legislators will presumably be lower,
because the effect will be more diluted given that it will be shared among more constituencies.
The districts are divided according to the number of constituencies they include. In particular,
the average number of constituencies during the three years is computed for all districts 39
to create two dummy variables, indicating whether the individual lives in a small or a large
district, i.e. if his or her district has more or less constituencies than the average district. The
female representation variable is then interacted with these dummy variables. The specification
tested is:
Yidt = θd + ψt + β1Fdt ∗D1d + β2Fdt ∗D2d + λTCdt +Xidtη + Zdtδ + εidt (7)
Where D1d and D2d are the dummy variables for the individual living in a large or a small
district, respectively40. The coefficients are then reported for the 2SLS estimates of the total
38Female politicians who belong to other parties that did not get the majority of seats in the state but that
are part of the coalition in power could have the same bargaining power as female politicians from the main
party. I do not have data on the different coalitions that have had power over time in the different states in
India Women in the party who got the majority of seats will almost surely be in the coalition, so they will
have more power than the rest. Presumably, if I could divide female representatives among those who belong
to the coalitions in power and those who do not, the difference between those coefficients would be even larger
than the difference obtained in Table 9.
39The mean is 9.29 constituencies per district.
40These variables are district-specific and do not change over time. I do not include D1d in the regression
as the regression already has district fixed effects.
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effect on individuals living in large districts, β
1
, and on individuals living in small districts,
β
2
. Results are shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 9, for the urban and rural sample,
respectively. The effect of female representatives in small districts is positive and significant,
and it is larger than the coefficient for female representatives obtained before. In large districts,
the coefficient for female representatives is smaller. In rural areas, female representatives do
not have any effect, neither in big nor in small districts. Results for small districts are now
slightly stronger than results in Table 9 for the urban sample, which allows me to conclude
that results obtained before are a lower bound of the real effect.
4.2.3 Does Political Disruption Matter?
One should expect that the effect of female politicians will be stronger in situations in which
politicians have more time to implement their policies. To test this, one can exploit the
variation created by the fact that some states have been under President’s rule in different
years and for different periods of time.
President’s rule is the term used in India to describe a situation in which a state government
is dissolved by its governor, and it is placed under direct federal rule. Article 356 of the
Indian Constitution enables President’s rule and gives the central government the authority
to invalidate any state government if the constitutional machinery in the state fails.
Politicians who were in power when the state was under President’s rule could have had
less power than the rest, because they had less time to implement their policies. In those cases,
the effect of female representation will be likely to be smaller, because female politicians will
have been in power for a smaller amount of time.
There is information on howmany months in each year each state was subject to President’s
rule. Then one can compute the total number of months with President’s rule during the three
years used to create the other political variables. Individuals in the sample are then classified
according to length of the time period during which the legislature was under President’s rule
within the three years before they started primary education.
Similar to what is done in the previous subsection, a dummy variable is created that is
equal to one if the individual has been exposed to more months of President’s rule than the
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mean41 and another dummy that is equal to one if the individual has been exposed to less
months of President’s rule than the mean. These variables are then interacted with the female
representation variable to estimate a model similar to specification (6). NowD1st is the dummy
variable indicating whether the individual has been exposed to more months of presidential
rule and D2st is the dummy variable indicating whether the individual has been exposed to
less months of presidential rule42. The coefficients reported are those for the 2SLS estimates
of the total effect on individuals that were affected by more President’s rule than the mean,
β
1
, and on individuals that were affected by less than the mean, β
2
.
Results are shown in columns (5) and (6) of Table 9, for the urban and rural sample
respectively. Coefficients in column (5) show that, in urban areas, female politicians have
an effect only in cases where they are in power with less disruption (i.e. President’s rule).
The effect on individuals affected by a longer period of President’s rule is smaller and not
significant. Results for the rural sample are presented in column (6), where none of the
coefficients is significant.
Thus, results suggest that female representatives have an effect in cases in which they can
exercise their power for a longer period, confirming the initial hypothesis that the effects found
on education are due to their policy actions.
4.2.4 The Effect of Having More Female Politicians in the State or in the District
Female legislators may have more bargaining power in states where there are more female
legislators. This could be the case if female legislators act as a group to fulfill their common
interests. However, the fact that there are other female legislators in the same district could
reduce the influence each one of them has, because they may be competing for the same
educational resources, those assigned to their district educational office.
To test this, the mean number of other female candidates in the state and the district
for each year is computed43 and the female representation variable is divided according to
41For States and years in which there has been President’s rule, the mean is 7.59 months over the three
years. The distribution is quite skewed to the left, with a minimum of 0.25 months in the three years period
and a maximum of 36 months.
42These dummy variables now vary across states and over time, the subscript s refers to a state. D1st is now
included as a control in the regression.
43The mean in the sample used is 0.71% for other female legislators in the district and 3.46% for other
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whether the female politicians have been in power in a state (district) with more female
legislators than the mean or not. Then, as it is done with the rest of the political variables,
three years averages of these two variables are taken. The specifications tested are similar to
specification (6). Results for these specifications are shown in columns (7)-(10) of Table 9.
The coefficients reported are those for the 2SLS estimates of the total effect on individuals
living in states (districts) with many female legislators, β
1
, and on individuals living in states
(districts) with fewer female legislators, β
2
.
Female legislators elected in states where there are more female legislators than the mean
are those who have an effect in urban areas. As before, no effect is found in rural areas.
This supports the idea that female legislators may act as a group, and their bargaining power
increases the more of them there is in a legislature. By comparing districts with more and
less female legislators, female legislators have an effect in urban areas in both cases. However,
female legislators elected in districts where more women are elected have a smaller effect than
the rest. If female legislators are competing for the districts’ educational offices’ funds, this is
likely to be the case, as more female legislators will try to obtain funds to spend in education
for their constituencies.
If female politicians act as a role model for citizens in their constituencies, it could be argued
that female politicians of the majority party or in states where there are more female legislators
are perceived as politicians who have more power and thus, their influence is stronger. This
effect could be captured more precisely in smaller districts, and in situations where the duration
of the President’s rule was minimum. However, if female politicians have an influence because
of the role model they play, then the number of other female legislators in the same district
should not matter, or should have a positive effect on their effect, which is not what is found
in this section.
female legislators in the state. It should be noted that in many districts there is only one female legislator.
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5 Conclusion
This paper shows that the gender of politicians affects educational outcomes of citizens living
in the districts where these politicians are elected. Female politicians have a larger effect than
male politicians on the education received by individuals living in urban areas but not by
those living in rural areas. The difference between rural and urban areas can be explained by
the fact that female politicians may invest more in education where women can benefit more
from it.
It is difficult to estimate the causal effect of the gender of politicians on educational out-
comes, as preferences of the electorate could be correlated both with female representation
and with education. A detailed dataset on politicians allows me to estimate the causal effect
of female legislators, by using quasi-experimental variation in female representation given by
the existence of close elections between women and men.
Given that female politicians may belong to higher classes than male politicians, the es-
timated effect of gender might capture the effect of class as well as gender. The Indian
institutional setting allows me to disentangle the effect of gender from the effect of economic
class, by dividing female representatives between those who contested for a seat reserved for
SC/STs and those who did not. SC/ST female politicians have a positive effect on education
in urban areas, but not in rural areas, whereas the effect of general female politicians is smaller
and less significant, suggesting that results obtained are due to the gender of politicians, and
not to their class.
There is little research on whether politicians target their policies to different groups in
the population, and what are the effects on individuals of these groups. If the identity of a
politician determines who the beneficiaries of the policies he or she implements are, increasing
some groups’ political representation may reduce inequality between these groups and the rest
of the population. This is especially important if those groups are relatively disadvantaged
with respect to the society as a whole. By matching politicians’ with beneficiaries’ identities,
this paper provides evidence that politicians benefit those who share their same identity. The
analysis focuses on caste reservations and on variations on female political representation and
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analyzes their effects on the probability that individuals who have the same identity as the
politicians attain primary education. It is found that female politicians tend to increase girls’
educational attainment in urban areas; in fact, SC/ST female politicians favor education of
girls and the SC/STs, while general female politicians favor education of girls and general
individuals.
It is difficult to assert the specific policies applied by female legislators, as I do not have
yearly data on schools and other educational inputs for each district. However, results show
that the effect of female representation is stronger when they are more likely to be influential,
either within the district or in the legislature.
Results obtained provide some evidence in favor of citizen-candidate models (Besley and
Coate 1997 and Osborne and Slivinski 1996), as the identity of the legislator has an effect
on policy. The issue of female political representation is increasingly important in India, and
there are growing pressures for female political reservation in the Central Government and
the State Assemblies. However, this proposal has been widely discussed in several parlia-
mentary sessions, without reaching to an agreement. Those who are in its favor, argue that
increasing female political representation will ensure a better representation of women’s needs.
Even those who oppose the reservation acknowledge the fact that female politicians behave
differently than male politicians. This paper corroborates these views with empirical evidence
and may shed some light on these issues, by considering the effect of the gender and caste of
the politicians on education and on who receives this education. Reservation would increase
female representation, but it would as well change the nature of political competition either
by changing the set of candidates available for each seat, by altering voters’ preferences, or by
changing the candidates’ quality44. Therefore, reservation could change other variables, but
it is an increase in female representation. The fact that female representatives of the party
that has the majority have more bargaining power to implement their policies and that, once
controlling for caste differences, SC/ST female politicians are those who mainly have an effect
should also be taken into account when considering reservation for women.
44See Chattopadhay,R. & Duflo,E (2004).
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6 Data appendix
6.0.5 Electoral data:
Collected from different volumes of the Statistical Reports on the General Elections to the
Legislative Assemblies. The election commission of India publishes one report for every election
in each state. There is data at the constituency level for the 16 main states in India for elections
held during 1967-2001.
-Proportion of seats in the district won by women: defined as the total number of seats in
which a woman won the election in the district divided by the total number of seats in the
district. Three years averages for each district are then computed.
-Proportion of seats reserved for SC/ST : defined as the total number of seats reserved
for SC/STs in the district divided by the total number of seats in the district. Three years
averages for each district are then computed.
-Proportion of seats won by women in a close election against a man: defined as the
number of women in the district who won by less than 3.5% of votes against a man over the
total number of seats in the district. Three years averages for each district are then computed.
-Proportion of seats in which a man and a woman contested in a close election: defined
as the number of men and women in the district who won by less than 3.5% of votes against
a candidate of the other gender over the total number of seats in the district. Three years
averages for each district are then computed.
-Proportion of seats won by SC/ST women in a close election against a SC/ST man:
defined as the number of SC/ST women in the district who won by less than 3.5% of votes
against a SC/ST man over the total number of seats in the district. Three years averages for
each district are then computed.
-Proportion of seats won by general women in a close election against a general man:
defined as the number of general women in the district who won by less than 3.5% of votes
against a general man over the total number of seats in the district. Three years averages for
each district are then computed.
-Proportion of seats won by each political party: number of seats won by the political
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party divided by total seats in the district. Three years averages for each district are then
computed. Congress parties include Indian National Congree Urs, Indian National Congress
Socialist Parties, and Indian National Congress. Hard Left parties include Communist Party of
India and Communist Party of India Marxist Parties. Soft Left parties include Praja Socialist
Party and Socialist Party. Janata parties include Janata, Lok Dal, and Janata Dal parties.
Hindu parties include the Bharatiya Janata Party. Regional parties include Telegu Desam,
Asom Gana Parishad, Jammu & Kashmir National Congress, Shiv Sena, Uktal Congress,
Shiromani Alkali Dal, and other state specific parties.
6.0.6 NSS Data:
55th Round of the National Sample Survey Organization Data. Household Schedule 10: Em-
ployment and Unemployment. The survey was conducted in India between July 1999 and
June 2000. I use the questions asked to individual members of each household.
-Primary education attainment : There is a question that classifies individuals according to
whether they are illiterate, literate through attending non-formal education courses or adult
education centers, literate through the Total Literacy Campaign or other programmes, literate
below primary education, individuals who achieved primary education and individuals who
achieved middle, secondary, higher secondary or graduate education. I then create a variable
that is equal to one if the individual obtained primary or a higher level of education
-Gender: Question about gender. I create a dummy variable that is equal to one if the
individual is a woman.
-Caste: Question about the individual’s social group. Dummy variable that is equal to
one if the respondent belongs to the SC/STs.
-Religion: Question about the individual’s religion. Dummy variable that is equal to one
if the respondent is Muslim or Hindu.
-Migration: Question about the last usual residence. There are various possibilities: same
district (urban/rural), same state but another district (rural/urban), another state(urban/rural)
and another country. There is another question about the period in years since the individual
left the last usual residence.
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-Workers: Individuals older than 15 who are employed according to "Usual Activity Sta-
tus" defined by the NSS. I create a variable that is equal to one if the individual falls in this
category and is zero otherwise.
-Non-agricultural workers: Classified according to NIC code of the "Usual Activity Status".
Workers (as before) who did not work in the primary sector. I create a dummy equal to one
if the individual works in the secondary or tertiary sectors and zero if the individual works in
the primary sector.
-Wages: Wages received for the work done during the reference week as reported by the
respondent, including wages in kind and in cash.
6.0.7 Demographics:
Data from 1961-1991 were obtained from the Indian district database created by Vanneman
and Barnes. Data from the Indian Census 2001 comes from the webpage “Education For All
in India”.
-Data on male and female literacy rates: literate males (and females) older than 5 over
total population of males (and females) older than 5 in the district.
-Data on SC/ST population: number of SC/ST individuals over the total population in
the district.
-Data on female population: number of women over total population in the district.
-Data on urban population: number of individuals living in urban areas over total popula-
tion in the district.
President’s rule:
Collected from Arora (1990), Kumar Sethy (2003) and web pages of the State Governments
in India. Data on the number of months with President’s rule per State and year.
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Variable (as a fraction of the total seats in the district)
Figure 1: Female Political Representation by State 1967-2001
Figure 2: Female Political Representation in the Different Districts by State 1967-2001
Figure 3: Fraction of Constituencies with Close Elections between Women and Men in the District by State and Year.
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Figure 4 Primary Education and Wages
Figure 5 Primary Education and Household Expenditure
Individual benefits from primary education (NSS 55th Round)
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics: District Political Dataset
Unit of observation: district in an electoral year
Variable (as a fraction of the total seats in the district)
1304 observations (full sample used in the regressions) Mean Sd
Proportion of seats won by women 0.0375 0.0742
Proportion of seats won by SC/ST  women 0.0092 0.0376
Proportion of seats won by general women 0.0283 0.0639
Proportion of seats won by women belonging to the main party in the state 0.0275 0.0648
Proportion of seats won by women belonging to others but the main party in the state 0.0100 0.0379
Proportion of seats won by Congress 0.4778 0.3372
Proportion of seats won by Hard Left 0.0572 0.1533
Proportion of seats won by Soft Left 0.0122 0.0692
Proportion of seats won by Hindu 0.1171 0.2229
Proportion of seats won by Janata 0.1823 0.2819
Proportion of seats won by Regional 0.0705 0.1920
Proportion of seats won by Others 0.0349 0.1167
Proportion of seats won by Independent 0.0480 0.0910
Proportion of seats reserved for SC/ST 0.2485 0.1884
Variable ( as a fraction of the total seats in the district in districts where women were elected)
346 observations (full sample used in the regressions) Mean Sd
Proportion of seats won by women in a close election against a man 0.0179 0.0453
Proportion of seats who had close elections between men and women 0.0212 0.0487
Proportion of seats won by women in a close election against a man (SC/ST) 0.0037 0.0248
Proportion of seats won by women in a close election against a man (general) 0.0141 0.0393
Proportion of seats won by women in a close election against a man (main party) 0.0119 0.0362
Proportion of seats won by women in a close election against a man (other parties) 0.0060 0.0292
Proportion of seats won by Congress women 0.0869 0.0918
Proportion of seats won by Congress men 0.4084 0.2858
Proportion of seats won by Hard Left women 0.0083 0.0405
Proportion of seats won by Hard Left men 0.0647 0.1619
Proportion of seats won by Soft Left women 0.0013 0.0151
Proportion of seats won by Soft Left men 0.0093 0.0644
Proportion of seats won by Hindu women 0.0131 0.0456
Proportion of seats won by Hindu men 0.0931 0.1672
Proportion of seats won by Janata women 0.0168 0.0443
Proportion of seats won by Janata men 0.1436 0.2232
Proportion of seats won by Regional women 0.0091 0.0329
Proportion of seats won by Regional men 0.0766 0.1896
Proportion of seats won by Others women 0.0018 0.0148
Proportion of seats won by Others men 0.0288 0.1089
Proportion of seats won by Independent women 0.0040 0.0231
Proportion of seats won by Independent men 0.0341 0.0657
Table 2: Descriptive statistics. NSS 55th Round and control variables.
Panel A:  NSS individual variables and labor market characteristics
RURAL URBAN
Variable Obs Mean Sd Obs Mean Sd
Women (proportion) 70604 0.4578 0.4982 34604 0.4105 0.4919
Men (proportion) 70604 0.5422 0.4982 34604 0.5895 0.4919
SC/ST (proportion) 70604 0.3328 0.4712 34604 0.1932 0.3948
Hindu (proportion) 70604 0.8485 0.3586 34604 0.7307 0.4436
Muslim (proportion) 70604 0.0974 0.2965 34604 0.1985 0.3989
Education by gender and SC/ST status
Primary education or more (proportion) 70604 0.5056 0.5000 34604 0.7736 0.4185
Women:  proportion with primary education or more 32198 0.3783 0.4850 14121 0.7477 0.4343
Men:  proportion with primary education or more 38406 0.6131 0.4870 20483 0.7917 0.4061
SC/ST: proportion with primary education or more 21241 0.3835 0.4863 6150 0.6601 0.4737
General: proportion with primary education or more 49363 0.5665 0.4956 28454 0.8008 0.3994
SC/ST women: proportion with primary education or more 9754 0.2481 0.4319 2360 0.6211 0.4852
General women:  proportion with primary education or more 22444 0.4436 0.4968 11761 0.7758 0.4171
SC/ST men: proportion with primary education or more 11487 0.4985 0.5000 3790 0.6845 0.4648
General men: proportion with primary education or more 26919 0.6701 0.4702 16693 0.8187 0.3853
Labour Market Characteristics by gender and education RURAL URBAN
Women with primary education or more: proportion who work 20493 0.0763 0.2655 21090 0.0454 0.2083
Men with primary education or more:  proportion who work 21300 0.3397 0.4736 17883 0.3642 0.4812
Women without primary education:  proportion who work 39218 0.1553 0.3622 15098 0.0708 0.2566
Men without primary education:  proportion who work 30717 0.2873 0.4525 12309 0.2275 0.4192
Women with primary edu who work: prop in nonfarm 1153 0.2877 0.4529 938 0.9547 0.2082
Men with primary edu who work: prop  in nonfarm 6539 0.4412 0.4966 6218 0.9556 0.2061
Women without primary edu who work: prop in nonfarm 5122 0.0826 0.2753 976 0.6931 0.4615
Men without primary edu who work: prop  in nonfarm 7896 0.1900 0.3923 2647 0.8520 0.3551
Women without primary education: wages received 5122 152.30 85.24 976 213.09 172.65
Men without primary education: wages received 7896 238.88 142.68 2647 358.15 254.51
Women with primary education: wages received 1153 221.32 286.79 938 736.10 856.40
Men with primary education: wages received 6539 367.28 374.26 6218 683.70 633.46
Panel B: Other variables
Variable Obs Mean Sd
Urban population in the district 5463 0.1924 0.1098
SC/ST population in the district 5463 0.2561 0.1380
Women in the district 5463 0.4827 0.0150
Male literacy rate in the district 5420 0.5178 0.1472
Female literacy rate in the district 5420 0.2671 0.1602
Number of months with President's Rule in the state 560 0.8576 2.5090
Data on workers refers to their usual activity. Workers are classified as people older than 15 years of age in the labour force not currently
looking for employment. Wages are computed from individuals older than 15 years of age who are working and are not self-employed.
Weighted using NSS weights.
Table 3: Data Issues
PANEL A: Data organization (examples)
Individual District Cohort Started Primary Politicians (average)
1 A 1964 1970 in power during 1967-1969 in district A
2 A 1965 1971 in power during 1968-1970 in district A
3 A 1987 1993 in power during 1990-1992 in district A
4 B 1964 1970 in power during 1967-1969 in district B
5 B 1965 1971 in power during 1968-1970 in district B
6 B 1987 1993 in power during 1990-1992 in district B
PANEL B: Individuals affected by close elections
Classification of individuals according to close elections between men and women in their district of residence
Individuals Fraction
No close elections 92447 0.8787
Close elections 12761 0.1213
Classification of individuals according to the number of men and women winning in close elections in their district of residence
Individuals Fraction
More women won against a man 6123 0.4798
More men won against a woman 6225 0.4878
The same number of men and women won 413 0.0324
Table 4: Do Female Politicians Have an Effect on Education?
Dependent variable: primary education attainment (1=primary education or higher, 0=otherwise)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS IV-Probit IV-Probit IV-Probit
All Urban Rural All Urban Rural All Urban Rural
individuals individuals individuals individuals individuals individuals individuals individuals individuals
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman 0.0969* 0.1333** 0.1105* 0.1120 0.6377** 0.0123 0.0996 0.6062** 0.0021
[0.0527] [0.0661] [0.0609] [0.1581] [0.2907] [0.1914] [0.1693] [0.2610] [0.2107]
Individual Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Demographic District Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Political Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
District fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Cohort fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 105208 34604 70604 105208 34604 70604 105208 34604 70604
R-squared 0.2541 0.1743 0.247 0.2541 0.1714 0.247
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are reported between parentheses. * Significant at the 10%, ** significant at the 5%, *** significant at the 1%. Columns 1-3 are OLS regressions. Columns 4-6 are
2SLS regressions in which the fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman in a close election against a man is used to instrument the fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman. Columns
7-9 are IVprobit regressions, in which the second stage is run as a probit. For the probit regressions average marginal effects are reported, the standard errors of which are computed using bootstrap with 100
replications. Close elections are defined as those in which the winner won the runner up by less than 3.5% of votes. Regressions include district and cohort fixed effects, as well as the following controls: the fraction
of seats won by each political party grouping, the fraction of reserved seats, the fraction of urban, SC/ST and female population, male and female literacy rates and dummy variables for whether the individual is a
woman, Muslim, Hindu, SC/ST or lives in a rural area where applies.  All these regressions also include as a control the fraction of constituencies in the district that had close elections between women and men. 
Table 5: First Stage Regressions
Dependent variable: Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman
1 2 3
All seats General seats SC/ST seats
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a  woman 1.2196***
in a close election against a man [0.0278]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a SC/ST woman 0.1935*** 0.8250***
in a close election against a man [0.0149] [0.0536]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a general woman 1.1698***  0.1410***
in a close election against a man [0.0168] [0.0126]
Controls yes yes yes
Observations 105208 105208 105208
First stage F-statistic 293.87 337.03 70.95
Joint Significance of Instruments 57.31 13.25
R-squared 0.5087 0.512 0.4785
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are reported between parentheses. * Significant at the 10%, ** significant at the 5%, ***
significant at the 1%. Close elections are defined as those in which the winner won the runner up by less than 3.5% of votes. All controls
included in the second stage regressions are included here
Table 6: Robustness and Placebos
Dependent variable: primary education attainment (1=primary education or higher, 0=otherwise)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
Placebo Placebo Placebo Placebo 3% 3% 2.50% 2.50% trends trends trends trends
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman -0.0549 0.3322
(effect on individuals who migrated to the area after the age of 14) [0.4851] [0.4783]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman -0.0546 -0.3161
(effect on individuals  aged 14-16 when they were in power) [0.2733] [0.1941]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman 0.6777* 0.0075 0.7036** 0.0846 0.7087** -0.0521 0.6668** -0.1519
[0.3458] [0.2227] [0.3261] [0.2246] [0.3420] [0.1731] [0.3319] [0.2171]
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Close elections defined with a smaller margin no no no no yes yes yes yes no no no no
State specific trends no no no no no no no no yes yes no no
District specific trends no no no no no no no no no no yes yes
Observations 12338 7381 22124 37714 34604 70604 34604 70604 34604 70604 34604 70604
R-squared 0.2280 0.2517 0.2083 0.216 0.1708 0.247 0.1704 0.247 0.1722 0.2494 0.1878 0.2547
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are reported between parentheses. * Significant at the 10%, ** significant at the 5%, *** significant at the 1%. Columns 1-12 are 2SLS regressions in which the fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman in
a close election against a man is used to instrument the fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman. Close elections are defined as those in which the winner won the runner up by less than 3.5% of votes, unless indicated otherwise. Regressions include district
and cohort fixed effects, as well as the following controls: the fraction of seats won by each political party grouping, the fraction of reserved seats, the fraction of urban, SC/ST and female population, male and female literacy rates and dummy variables for whether the
individual is a woman, Muslim, Hindu, SC/ST or lives in a rural area where applies. Time trends are included in columns 9-12. All these regressions also include as a control the fraction of constituencies in the district that had close elections between women and men. 
TABLE 7:  Is caste important?
Dependent variable: primary education attainment (1=primary education or higher, 0=otherwise)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV
All Urban Rural All Urban Rural All Urban Rural
individuals individuals individuals individuals individuals individuals individuals individuals individuals
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a SC/ST woman 0.1941 0.0868 0.2471 0.1333 1.2934* -0.0823 0.1507 1.3354* -0.1369
[0.1426] [0.1661] [0.1697] [0.3842] [0.7379] [0.4438] [0.3647] [0.8011] [0.5213]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a general woman 0.0657 0.1475* 0.0662 0.1033 0.4235 0.0521 0.1076 0.5258* 0.0477
[0.0541] [0.0865] [0.0596] [0.1663] [0.2813] [0.1997] [0.1938] [0.2817] [0.2136]
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 105208 34604 70604 105208 34604 70604 105208 34604 70604
R-squared 0.2541 0.1743 0.2471 0.2541 0.1696 0.2469
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are reported between parentheses. * Significant at the 10%, ** significant at the 5%, *** significant at the 1%.Columns 1-3 are OLS regressions. Columns 4-6 are 2SLS
regressions in which the fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman in a close election against a man is used to instrument the fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman, both for general and SC/ST
female legislators. Columns 7-9 are IVprobit regressions, in which the second stage is run as a probit. For the probit regressions average marginal effects are reported, the standard errors of which are computed using bootstrap with
100 replications. Close elections are defined as those in which the winner won the runner up by less than 3.5% of votes. Regressions include district and cohort fixed effects, as well as the following controls: the fraction of seats
won by each political party grouping, the fraction of reserved seats, the fraction of urban, SC/ST and female population, male and female literacy rates and dummy variables for whether the individual is a woman, Muslim, Hindu,
SC/ST or lives in a rural area where applies. Regressions also include as a control the fraction of constituencies in the district that had close elections between women and men.
Table 8 : Female Politicians on individuals with different identities
Dependent variable: primary education attainment (1=primary education or higher, 0=otherwise)
Indentity girls boys SC/ST general girls SC/ST girls general boys SC/ST boys general difference r-squared observations
PANEL A: URBAN AREAS
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman 0.7826*** 0.5140* 0.2685 0.1719 34604
interacted with dummy=1 if individual is of a given identity [0.3086] [0.3089] [0.2231]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a SC/ST woman 1.4971*** 1.0746 0.4225
interacted with dummy=1 if individual is of a given identity [0.6605] [0.7747] [0.2638]
0.1702 34604
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a general woman 0.5349* 0.3392 0.1957
interacted with dummy=1 if individual is of a given identity [0.3220] [0.3151] [0.3090]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a SC/ST woman 2.8388*** 0.9281 1.9107***
interacted with dummy=1 if individual is of a given identity [0.6526] [0.6307] [0.2134]
0.1662 34604
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a general woman 0.0039 0.5645* -0.5606
interacted with dummy=1 if individual is of a given identity [0.6085] [0.2948] [0.6308]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a SC/ST woman 3.0915*** 1.1880** 2.5989*** 0.6116
interacted with dummy=1 if individual is of a given identity [0.9093] [0.5147] [0.4637] [0.6661]
0.1669 34604
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a general woman -0.2682 0.7052* 0.1722 0.46327
interacted with dummy=1 if individual is of a given identity [0.7813] [0.3599] [0.6757] [0.3277]
PANEL B: RURAL AREAS
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman 0.0435 -0.0149 0.0584 0.247 70604
interacted with dummy=1 if individual is of a given identity [0.2332] [0.2642] [0.3220]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a SC/ST woman 0.0862 -0.3474 0.4335
interacted with dummy=1 if individual is of a given identity [0.3868] [0.9558] [0.9785]
0.2468 70604
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a general woman -0.0075 0.1207 -0.1282
interacted with dummy=1 if individual is of a given identity [0.2499] [0.2300] [0.2314]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a SC/ST woman -0.6228* 0.4294 -1.0521***
interacted with dummy=1 if individual is of a given identity [0.3723] [0.4986] [0.3612]
0.2462 70604
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a general woman 0.0165 0.0492 -0.0326
interacted with dummy=1 if individual is of a given identity [0.3338] [0.2028] [0.3349]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a SC/ST woman -0.2361 0.0181 -1.6939 0.6223
interacted with dummy=1 if individual is of a given identity [0.3122] [0.6121] [1.2435] [0.6779] 0.2448 70604
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a general woman -0.2865 0.1828 0.3738 -0.0034
interacted with dummy=1 if individual is of a given identity [0.3976] [0.3218] [0.4047] [0.2177]
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are reported between parentheses. * Significant at the 10%, ** significant at the 5%, *** significant at the 1%. Close elections are defined as those in which the winner won the runner up by less than 3.5% of votes. All controls
included in the previous tables are included here, together with dummies indicating individual identity.
Table 9: Measures of Political Influence
Dependent variable: primary education attainment (1=primary education or higher, 0=otherwise)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
individuals individuals individuals individuals individuals individuals individuals individuals individuals individuals
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by  a  woman 0.6945* 0.1015
who belongs to the party who won the majority in the state [0.3609] [0.2207]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by  a  woman 0.5059 -0.2431
who does not belong to the party who won the majority in the state [0.5346] [0.2998]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a  woman 0.7846* -0.1000
(effect on individuals living in small districts) [0.3987] [0.2172]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman 0.5100 0.2189
(effect on individuals living in large districts) [0.3261] [0.2865]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a  woman 0.6877** 0.0226
(effect on individuals who were exposed to less  months of President's rule) [0.2915] [0.1938]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a  woman -0.1339 0.1076
(effect on individuals who were exposed to more months of President's rule) [1.3357] [0.4037]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a  woman  0.6637**   0.0521
in states where more women are elected [0.2974] [ 0.1993]
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman 0.5475 -0.1218
in states where less women are elected  [0.4304] [  0.2639]
  0.5436** 0.1932
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by  a  woman [  0.2130] [  0.1555]
where there are more women in the district
  0.8112* -0.2413
Fraction of constituencies in the district won by  a  woman [ 0.4736] [ 0.2930]
where there are less women in the district
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 34604 70604 34604 70604 34604 70604 34604 70604 34604 70604
R-squared 0.1710 0.2470 0.3825 0.2467 0.1707 0.2470 0.172 0.247 0.1706 0.2464
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are reported between parentheses. * Significant at the 10%, ** significant at the 5%, *** significant at the 1%. Columns 1-10 are 2SLS regressions in which the fraction of constituencies in the district won by
a woman in a close election against a man is used to instrument the fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman. In columns 1 and 2 the fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman from the party that had the majority in a close election
against a man is used to instrument the fraction of constituencies in the district won by a woman from the party that had the majority. The same is true for women legislators who belong to the party that did not have the majority. Close elections are defined as
those in which the winner won the runner up by less than 3.5% of votes. Regressions include district and cohort fixed effects, as well as the following controls: the fraction of seats won by each political party grouping, the fraction of reserved seats, the fraction
of urban, SC/ST and female population, male and female literacy rates and dummy variables for whether the individual is a woman, Muslim, Hindu, SC/ST or lives in a rural area where applies. All these regressions also include as a control the fraction of
constituencies in the district that had close elections between women and men.
A Appendix: Are Female Leaders Good for Education?
Evidence from India. Author: Irma Clots-Figueras
(Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
A.1 Checks on the Identification Strategy
In this section I show some facts that support the validity of the identification strategy used.
I address three issues. First of all, I provide evidence that the outcome of a close election can
not be predicted by observables, which supports the idea that the outcome of a close election
is random . In addition, I show that districts and constituencies in which female candidates
won in close elections against men are similar in observables to those in which male candidates
won in close elections against women. Finally, I provide evidence that districts that had close
elections between men and women are not systematically different from other districts in India.
A.1.1 Randomness of Close Election Outcomes
If there are political or demographic characteristics that predict the probability that women
win in close elections in the district, the outcome of the close elections and, thus, the gender
of the winners cannot be considered random. To estimate the probability that women won
in close elections in a district, I calculate the proportion of close elections won by women
by district in each electoral year. I calculate this probability for all seats, and separately for
SC/ST reserved seats and unreserved seats. I then regress this probability on the fraction
of seats contested by the different party groupings in close elections, the proportion of urban
population, the proportion of female and SC/ST population, male and female literacy rates,
the number of times that women have won elections in the past in that district and the
proportion of reserved seats. Results are shown in Table A1, and they confirm that none of
the coefficients turn out to be significant, suggesting that the outcome of a close election is
indeed random.
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A.1.2 Comparing on Observables
If the winner’s gender in a close election between a man and a woman is random, we expect
that districts in which more women won in close elections should be very similar to districts
in which more men won in close elections.
Table A2 provides information on the differences in district characteristics according to the
number of women who won against men and number of men who won against women in the
district. Districts are classified in two groups, those in which more men won and those in which
more women won. I then compute the differences in district characteristics between these two
groups. I do this considering the elections in which the winner has lead over the runner-up by
margins of 3.5% of votes. Differences are computed for all seats and then separately for general
seats and seats reserved for SC/ST. I use information at the district level on the proportion
of urban and SC/ST population, male and female literacy rates, the number of seats, the
fraction of seats reserved for SC/STs, the proportion of villages with educational institutions
and hospitals and the proportion of seats won by female and male candidates in elections that
are not close. All columns show that districts in which more men won in close elections with
this or a smaller margin and districts where more women won in close elections with this or a
smaller margin are very similar in all these variables.
In summary, districts in which more women won in close elections are very similar to
districts in which more men won in close elections, irrespective of the type of seat where the
close elections take place.
One should also observe that constituency and individual characteristics of women and men
winning in close elections are the same. I also analyze some of these characteristics that could
compromise the comparability between close elections in which men won and close elections
in which women won. I compare candidate and constituency characteristics for all seats and
I also compare this separately for SC/ST reserved seats and unreserved seats.
First of all, there might be concerns that two different constituencies in which a woman
contested in a close election against a man might not be similar if in one of them there were
many other women candidates, apart from the winner or the runner-up, contesting for the
same seat. This would be a case in which political parties perceive the constituency as one
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in which there is “preference for female politicians” and tend to field female candidates there.
If the number of female candidates contesting for the same seat as the two close candidates
is significantly different for constituencies in which a man won in a close election against a
woman and constituencies in which a woman won in a close election against a man, these
two types of constituencies might have different characteristics. I have data on all the female
candidates contesting in a particular constituency, apart from the winner and the runner-up.
As shown in the top panel of Table A3, for any type of seat, the number of other female
candidates contesting against women who won in close elections against a man is very small
and not significantly different from that for men who won in close elections against a woman.
It might also be that one of the candidates in a close election is in this situation because
he or she is the incumbent for that seat in that particular constituency. This would make
constituencies in which women and men won in close elections against a candidate of the other
gender different in observables if men (or women) are those who tend to be the incumbent.
Moreover, if there is incumbency advantage (or disadvantage) in these elections, more women
(or men) would win in this type of elections and one could question the extent to which
the outcome of a close election is random. It should also be taken into account that the
policies applied by candidates who were the incumbent and who won the elections again
might be different from those of candidates who occupy the seat for the first time, because
they will have more experience as legislators. To address this concern I use the fact that I
have information on the candidate’s names, thus, I can know whether a particular candidate
was already in power in the same constituency where he or she is contesting now during the
previous electoral year. I then create a dummy variable that is equal to one if the individual
was the incumbent for that seat. However, as it is shown in the second panel of Table A3,
the percentage of winners in close elections who were the incumbent is statistically the same
for female and male legislators who won in close elections, irrespective of the type of seat in
which they were contesting.
Another concern that needs to be addressed is that maybe there are some constituencies
in which there have been more close elections between men and women in the past than in
others. If this happens more often in constituencies where women won the close election than
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in constituencies in which men won, then these two types of constituencies would not be
comparable, since in the one where there have been more close elections there would probably
be more “preference for female politicians”. In the third panel of Table A3, I test whether
constituencies in which a man or a woman won in a close election are different in terms of how
many times the particular constituencies have had close elections between men and women.
However, results show that the number of previous close elections is the same, whether a
woman or a man won. This is the case for all seats, for SC/ST reserved seats and for general
seats. Thus, women won in close elections in situations in which the electoral preferences for
female politicians are similar as situations in which men won in close elections.
Finally, if elections in which men and women won in close elections are similar, they should
have the same electoral turnout, otherwise, one type of constituency would be more active in
electoral terms than the other. And, more importantly, the distribution of votes between the
first two candidates and the rest should be the same. This is the case because if in one case
the total votes were distributed among many candidates, these could not be considered as
close elections between the winner and the runner-up. The last two panels of Table A3 show
that women who won in close elections won by the same number of votes as men who won in
close elections, and in constituencies where the total number of votes was the same. Because
constituencies in India were designed to have the same population, this means that turnout
was the same, and the distribution of votes between the first candidate and the rest was the
same as well. This further corroborates that constituencies in which a man or a woman won
in a close election are perfectly comparable and thus, the gender of the winner is, indeed,
random. These two panels also eliminate concerns that, if in a constituency there were three
candidates with almost the same number of votes, one could not consider the election between
the winner and the runner up as a close election. In fact, the winners in close elections tend to
receive approximately 40% of votes, which means that the runner-up will receive a minimum
of 36.5% of votes. This leaves the other candidates with 23.5% of votes, which is a very big
difference compared with the winner. Thus, even if there was another strong candidate in the
constituency, he or she did not have any chance of winning the election.45 As before, this is
45As it was proven before, there are no concerns regarding the gender of these other candidates.
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the case for all types of seats.
A.1.3 External Validity
Overall, 141 out of 297 districts never had a close election between a man and a woman, which
is slightly less than half the districts in my sample. However, it could be argued that close
elections between men and women take place in districts that are different, or more progressive,
than the average district in India. Even if there is a significant amount of individuals affected
by close elections, if districts that never had close elections are very different from those that
did, results obtained in this paper would not be representative for the entire India. Table A4
shows that districts that never had close elections and those that did are similar in observables.
For districts that never had close elections and districts that did, it shows descriptive statistics
for population characteristics, the proportion of reserved seats, the total number of seats, and
public goods like hospitals and educational institutions weighted by the population in the
years when elections took place.
Finally, there might be concerns that the probability of contesting a close election between
a woman and a man is different for each political party. If this were the case, close elections
would not reflect the overall situation in the parliament because only a few parties would be
involved. Table A5 shows how the distribution of seats among the different party groupings is
the same for close elections between men and women as for the rest. Thus, party composition
seems not to be a concern, because the party composition in close elections reflects that of the
overall parliaments in the States46.
A.2 Education in India
In India, although within the States and Union Territories there are differences in the number
of years constituting primary, middle and secondary education, there is a uniform structure
of school education.
The primary stage consists of classes I-V, in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu
46Since this test is done at the district level and districts can have both general and reserved seats, I can
not compare districts with and without SC/ST close elections between women and men and districts with and
without general close elections between women and men.
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& Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and
West Bengal.47 On the other hand, it consists of classes I-IV in Assam, Gujarat, Karnataka,
Kerala, and Maharashtra.
The middle stage consists of classes VI-VIII in Bihar, Haryana, Jammu&Kashmir, Madhya
Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. Classes V-VII in
Assam, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, and Maharashtra. And classes VI-VII in Andhra Pradesh
and Orissa.
The secondary stage consists of classes IX-X in Bihar, Haryana, Jammu & Kashmir, Mad-
hya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. And classes
VIII-X in Assam, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and Orissa.
The minimum age for admission in the first class of the primary stage is 5 or 6 years of
age, depending on the State or Union Territory. The majority of States and Union Territories
have established free education; however, in some States education is not free for classes IX
and above.48
47Among others. Only the 16 main states in India are considered in this study.
48The highest annual fee is Rs. 360 in Meghalaya, when the lowest is Rs. 48 in Assam. Mean annual
household income lies arund Rs. 34551.
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Table A1: Probability that a Woman Wins in a Close Election against a Man
Dependent variable:  proportion of women who won in a close election 
against a man per district and electoral year All General SC/ST
1 2 3
Proportion of seats contesting close elections Congress -1.412 -1.59 0.201
(2.607) (2.14) (0.923)
Proportion of seats contesting close elections Regional Parties -3.332 -3.235 0.026
(4.882) (5.297) (1.427)
Proportion of seats contesting close elections Hindu -1.247 -1.636 0.227
(2.706) (1.908) (1.026)
Proportion of seats contesting close elections Janata -1.81 -0.914 -0.212
(2.075) (2.37) (1.403)
Proportion of seats contesting close elections Others -0.433 -1.833 0.082
(2.389) (1.585) (0.973)
Proportion of seats contesting close elections Independent -1.546 -0.593 0.203
(2.303) (2.372) (1.13)
Dummy=1 if the district never had close elections before 0.241 0.439 -0.175
(0.635) (0.619) (0.268)
Proportion of urban population 12.587 9.872 0.905
(12.85) (12.87) (4.877)
Number of times that a woman has won an election in the district in the past -0.006 -0.018 0.019
(0.051) (0.051) (0.032)
Proportion of SC/ST population 18.497 14.479 1.748
(19.496) (20.603) (6.104)
Proportion of population that is female -15.535 -16.19 -0.87
(27.662) (27.874) (8.031)
Male literacy rate -1.923 -5.524 2.915
(10.817) (11.364) (4.376)
Female literacy rate -0.494 2.343 -2.358
(7.249) (8.239) (3.87)
Proportion of seats reserved for SC/ST's -2.931 -1.849 -0.766
(5.313) (5.769) (1.741)
Observations 164 164 164
Adjusted R-squared -0.059  -0.1474  0.5242
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level. District and year fixed effects are included in the
regression.
Table A2: District Characteristics: Close Elections between Women and Men by type of seat
General SC/ST All
Seats Seats Seats
Differences in the proportion of urban population 0.0019 -0.0372 -0.01020
(Districts in which more men than women won compared to districts in which more women than men won) [0.0201] [-0.0371] 0.0179]
Differences in male literacy rate -0.0409 -0.0374 -0.02920
(Districts in which more men than women won compared to districts in which more women than men won) [0.0292] [0.0474] 0.0255]
Differences in female literacy rate -0.0415 -0.0249 -0.02820
(Districts in which more men than women won compared to districts in which more women than men won) [0.0345] [0.0521] [0.0296]
Differences in the proportion of villages with educational institutions 0.0275 -0.0548 0.01470
(Districts in which more men than women won compared to districts in which more women than men won) [0.0418] [0.0601] [0.0342]
Differences in the proportion of villages with hospitals 0.0067 0.0014 0.00550
(Districts in which more men than women won compared to districts in which more women than men won) [0.0136] [0.0093] [0.0107]
Differences in the proportion of SC/ST reserved seats -0.0111 0.0467 -0.00380
(Districts in which more men than women won compared to districts in which more women than men won) [0.0203] [0.0857] [0.0272]
Differences in the proportion of women who won in elections that are not close -0.0044 0.0005 -0.00130
(Districts in which more men than women won compared to districts in which more women than men won) [0.0091] [0.0184] [0.0083]
Differences in the proportion of men who won in elections that are not close -0.0090 -0.0331 -0.01230
(Districts in which more men than women won compared to districts in which more women than men won) [0.0112] [0.0238] [0.0103]
Number of districts with election-years 157 47 201
Table A3
Constituency and candidate characteristics: Close Elections between Women and Men
All General SC/ST
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Obs Mean Std. Err. Obs Mean Std. Err.
Other female candidates in the constituency
Man won in close election 120 0.1083 0.0370 91 0.1209 0.0464 29 0.0690 0.0479
Woman won in close election 110 0.2000 0.0480 92 0.1957 0.0541 18 0.2222 0.1008
Difference -0.0917 0.0601 -0.0748 0.0713 -0.1533 0.0998
Winner was the incumbent
Man won in close election 120 0.2167 0.0378 91 0.1868 0.0411 29 0.3103 0.0874
Woman won in close election 110 0.2182 0.0396 92 0.2065 0.0424 18 0.2778 0.1086
Difference -0.0015 0.0547 -0.0197 0.0591 0.0326 0.1402
Number of close elections in the past
Man won in close election 120 1.0750 0.0241 91 1.0769 0.0281 29 1.0690 0.0479
Woman won in close election 110 1.0727 0.0249 92 1.0870 0.0295 18 1.0000 0.0000
Difference 0.0023 0.0347 -0.0100 0.0408 0.0690 0.0610
Votes received by the winner
Man won in close election 120 31894.1700 1328.4220 91 32270.3300 1546.5520 29 30713.7900 2616.1900
Woman won in close election 110 33596.4500 1330.2330 92 34100.9800 1467.4050 18 31017.7800 3155.1360
Difference -1702.2880 1883.4150 -1830.6490 2131.3730 -303.9847 4149.1090
Total votes in the constituency
Man won in close election 120 80188.3300 2769.9040 91 81835.1600 3064.8000 29 75020.6900 6239.4270
Woman won in close election 110 80947.2700 2655.8640 92 82061.9600 2878.3610 18 75250.0000 6886.6940
Difference -758.9394 3851.7720 -226.7917 4203.1950 -229.3103 9606.6320
Table A4
Comparison: Districts with and without Close Elections
(District in an electoral year) Close elections No close elections
Urban population (prop) mean 0.2149 0.1947
sd 0.0052 0.0039
observations 968 1124
Male literacy rate mean 0.5241 0.5454
sd 0.0054 0.0049
observations 946 1098
Female literacy rate mean 0.2878 0.2865
sd 0.0059 0.0054
observations 946 1098
SC/ST population (prop) mean 0.2618 0.2443
sd 0.0047 0.0038
observations 968 1124
SC/ST seats proportion mean 0.2564 0.2178
sd 0.0055 0.0054
observations 1223 1323
Seats total mean 10.8397 7.9426
sd 0.1382 0.1259
observations 1223 1323
Any educational institution mean 0.8212 0.7932
sd 0.0079 0.0084
observations 316 348
Hospitals mean 0.0290 0.0262
sd 0.0025 0.0025
observations 736 812
Table A5
Proportion of Seats Won by Parties
Close Elections No close elections
Party Percent Percent
Congress 40.43 41.16
Hard Left 7.83 8.17
Hindu 11.74 11.44
Independents 6.96 5.81
Janata 9.57 13.98
Regional 12.61 10.38
Soft Left 3.91 2.31
Others 6.96 6.75
Total 100 100
